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THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE AGREEMENT
CASES: THE EVOLVING PRESIDENTIAL
CLAIMS SETTLEMENT POWER
by Deborah Godich Hardwick
ON November 14, 1979, Iranian militants seized the American Em-
bassy in Tehran.' Demanding that the United States return the
Shah and his wealth to Iran, the militants held fifty-two American
citizens hostage for 444 days. On January 18, 1981, after a series of com-
plex negotiations, the United States and Iran agreed to terms.2 Then, on
January 19, 1981, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher executed,
on behalf of the President, the corresponding executive agreements that
secured the hostages' release. The United States agreed, among other
things, to terminate American claims against Iran in return for the estab-
lishment of a claims tribunal vested with a binding arbitration power,3 and
to return Iranian assets held in the United States.4
Although no express constitutional provision supports the President's
power to enter executive agreements, such as the Iranian Hostage Agree-
ment, without the advice and consent of the Senate, the President's agree-
ment power traditionally has been accepted in practice. In addition, the
total legal authority of the President's foreign relations power supports a
Presidential power to settle the international claims of nonconsenting
American citizens by executive agreement. The President's authority to
settle claims, however, is limited by the fifth amendment prohibition
against the taking of private property for public purposes without just
1. For a more detailed summary of the facts of the hostage crisis and the executive
agreements arising from it, see notes 131-51 infra and accompanying text.
2. Two declarations by the Government of Algeria, which had mediated the negotia-
tions, reflect the points of agreement between the United States and Iran that secured the
hostages' release. Declaration of Algeria, Jan. 18-19, 1981, United States-Iran, 81 DEP'T
STATE BULL. No. 2047, at 1 (1981); Declaration of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of
Claims by the United States of America and Iran, Jan. 18-19, 1981, United States-Iran, id. at
3 [hereinafter cited as Agreement I and Agreement II respectively, and referred to collec-
tively as the Iranian Hostage Agreement].
3. Agreement I, supra note 2, B.
4. Id. points II-IIL.
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compensation.5 Although the courts never have invalidated a claims set-
tlement agreement on fifth amendment grounds, by suspending and sub-
mitting to arbitration claims already before United States courts, the
Iranian Hostage Agreement stretches the outer limits of the President's au-
thority to settle claims by executive agreement without the claimants'
consent.6
This Comment traces the President's role in international affairs and the
Presidential power to enter into executive agreements from the earliest
days of the nation to the present. Particular emphasis is placed on the
evolution of the President's power to settle claims of United States citizens
by executive agreement. In addition, this Comment examines several re-
cent cases arising out of the Iranian Hostage Agreement, and the impact of
Dames & Moore v. Regan,7 the Supreme Court's initial response to the
Iranian Hostage Agreement, on prior law.
I. THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
A. The Constitutional Foreign Relations Power
The aggregation of powers expressly delegated to the President by the
Constitution constitutes the foreign relations power.8 The constitutional
provisions assigning powers relevant to foreign relations solely to the exer-
cise of the President are the executive power clause, 9 the commander in
chief clause,' 0 the power to receive ambassadors clause," and the clause
requiring the President to faithfully execute the laws of the United
States.' 2 These provisions impliedly vest in the President the power to
serve as spokesman for the United States in international matters. 3 On
their face these constitutional sections do not reveal the strength and
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation").
6. The claims settled by the President in the Iranian Hostage Agreement affect approx-
imately 400 suits involving claims totalling three to four billion dollars. Norton & Collins,
Reflections on the Iranian Hostage Settlement, 67 A.B.A.J. 428, 432 (1981). Only 15% of the
estimated 2,500 potential claims have been filed. Id. Some nonfiling claimants hope for
out-of-court settlements, while others are avoiding litigation to enhance the prospect of ob-
taining future Iranian business. Id.; see Cutler, Negotiating the Iranian Settlement, 67
A.B.A.J. 996, 1000 (1981); Swan, Rflections on Dames & Moore v. Regan and the Miami
Conference, 13 LAW. AMERICAS i, i (1981).
7. 101 S. Ct. 2972, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918 (1981).
8. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrruTioN 45 (1972).
9. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
10. "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States." Id. art. II, § 2, cl. i.
11. The President "shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers." Id. art. II,
§ 3, cl. 1. The power to receive ambassadors is the only presidential constitutional power
that expressly includes the authority to deal with foreign nations. See L. HENKIN, supra
note 8, at 40-41.
12. The President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3, cl. I.
13. A. Ltvrrr, THE PRESIDENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED
STATES 21 (1954).
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breadth of the President's power.14 In reality, the circumstances and ne-
cessities of international relations and general patterns of diplomatic prac-
tices have facilitated the President's acquisition of an expansive foreign
relations power.' 5 Practical considerations require the control of foreign
affairs by the President, rather than Congress. The President is ready to
act at any given time and is able to do so more swiftly than Congress. 16
Additionally, the President has easier access to foreign affairs information
and is better able to keep sensitive negotiations and decisions secret.' 7
Moreover, the legislative and judicial branches' continued recognition of
the President's control of international affairs,' 8 coupled with the Presi-
dent's monopoly of the federal foreign affairs mechanism, has solidified his
position as the nation's principal spokesman and authority in matters of
foreign policy.' 9 The Supreme Court itself recognized "the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the fed-
eral government in the field of international relations. '20
An examination of Presidential practice during times of crisis demon-
strates the expansive quality of the foreign relations power. In such times
the President's capacity to control foreign affairs becomes broader, and
this expansion has never been labelled a violation of the separation of
powers.2' For example, during times of war, Presidents historically have
held greater authority to act than that held during times of peace. When
14. L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 41.
15. Id. at 37. The total foreign relations power of the nation is vested in the federal
o vernment rather than in the states, because "foreign affairs are national affairs." Id. at 15.
he foreign relations power, therefore, is distributed among the branches of the federal gov-
ernment. Id. at 33-34.
16. Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude InternationalAgree-
ments, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 349 (1955).
17. Id.
18. See id. at 346; L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 38, 208. Henkin reports that the Supreme
Court never has invalidated a Presidential act related to foreign affairs on grounds that the
authority of the federal government had been overreached. Id. at 208.
19. L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 45-47. The Constitution provides that the President
with the consent of the Senate shall appoint "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls. . . and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2. Individuals appointed to foreign relations positions by the President are responsible to
the President and receive direction from him as to what will or will not be communicated to
other nations. L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 46.
20. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). In Curtiss-
Wright the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of individuals selling guns to Bolivia in
violation of a Presidential embargo proclamation. In rejecting the defendant's claims that
the embargo was an unconstitutional exercise of Presidential power, Justice Sutherland in a
dictum advocated an expansive view of the President's foreign relations powers. He asserted
that the power derived from the external sovereignty transferred to the nation upon its sepa-
ration from Great Britain. Id. at 316. Accordingly, Justice Sutherland reasoned that the
foreign relations power of the federal government did not depend on affirmative grants of
the Constitution. Id. at 318. Critics charge that this dictum in the Curtiss- Wright opinion
invites a Presidential abuse of power in the foreign relations area. See, e.g., Berger, The
Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. Rav. 1, 26-31 (1972); Comment,
Executive Agreements, The Treaty-Makling Clause, and Strict Construction, 8 Loy. L.A.L.
Rav. 587, 602-09 (1975).
21. Mathews, supra note 16, at 346. See general, Thomas & Thomas, Presidential War-
Making Power.- A Political Question?, 35 Sw. L.J. 879 (1981).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
peace has been restored, this expanded power has been countered by an
assertion of legislative authority.22 Thus, in terms of its total legal author-
ity, the President's foreign relations power is best considered an inherently
flexible aggregation of express and implied powers.23
In addition to the foreign relations powers expressly and impliedly as-
signed to the President, the President shares an enumerated constitutional
treaty power with the Congress. -The President has the power to make
treaties "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate."24 A treaty is
"a formal instrument of agreement by which two or more States establish
or seek to establish a relation under international law between them-
selves."' 25 By its very nature, the treaty is a significant instrument in the
implementation of foreign policy.26
The President serves three functions in the treaty-making process. First,
because the President is the exclusive communicator with foreign nations,
he ultimately determines when treaty negotiations will take place and con-
trols their course.27 Secondly, the final act of treaty-making, ratification, is
performed by the President.28 The advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate present, however, is a condition precedent to ratification. 29 The
Senate's involvement in the treaty-making process reflects an inherent re-
gard for the separation of powers doctrine, satisfies the need for a foreign
affairs public forum, and provides additional expertise in the field of for-
eign policy.30 One school of thought stresses that both advice, meaning
opinions given before commitments are made or documents are prepared,
and consent of two-thirds of the Senate present are required before the
President can make a treaty.31 Conversely, the advice and consent provi-
sion has been described as nothing more than a veto or amendment
22. Mathews, supra note 16, at 346 n.4 (citing D. CHEEVER & H. HAVILAND, AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 6 (1952)).
23. L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 45.
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. References to treaties elsewhere in the Constitution
highlight the sinificance of the treaty-making power. The Constitution expressly withholds
the treaty-making power from the states by stating that "[n]o State shall enter into any
Treaty." ld. art. I, §10, cL 1. The federal judiciary power extends to "all Cases. . . arising
under. . . Treaties made, or which shall be made." Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Finally, the
Supremacy Clause provides that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made.. . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land." Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
25. Leary, International Executive Agreements: A Guide to the Legal Issues and Research
Sources, 72 LAw. LIB. J. 1, 2 (1979) (quoting The Harvard Research in International Law,
art. 1, 29 AM. J. IrNr'L L. Supp. 686 (1935)). Leary cautions that that the word treaty has a
narrower meaning in the United States than in the rest of the world, because it is used only
in reference to those international agreements made with the advice and consent of two-
thirds of the Senate present. Id.
26. The need for centralized government control over treaty enforcement was a vital
force behind the convening of the Constitutional Convention and the Convention's efforts to
form a stronger union. S. CRANDALL, TREATIEs, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 51
(2d ed. 1916).
27. Id. at 93. As a practical matter the Congress is powerless in the area of negotiations.
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
28. S. CRANDALL, supra note 26, at 94.
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, ci. 2.
30. Berger, supra note 20, at 55-58.
31. A. LviTT, supra note 13, at 16-17.
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power.32 Thirdly, the President makes treaty proclamations, public an-
nouncements of treaty terms, and executes ratification. 33 Thus, the treaty
power, along with the independent Presidential powers, endows the Presi-
dent with broad foreign relations authority.
B. The Executive Agreement Power
Executive agreements provide the President with an alternative to trea-
ties for implementing foreign policy decisions. Executive agreements are
defined as "all international agreements which become binding on the
United States in other ways-through the action of the President alone or
through the action of the President together with Congress. ' 34 The Consti-
tution's only mention of international agreements is in reference to the
states, which are prohibited from entering into such agreements without
the consent of Congress. 35 Thus, the state agreement power, not the execu-
tive agreement power, is distinguished from the nation's treaty-making au-
thority in the Constitution.36 Notwithstanding this lack of express
constitutional authorization for executive agreements, Presidents have exe-
cuted thousands of agreements throughout American history.37 Historical
documentation of the Constitutional Convention38 and judicial dicta39
support the validity of executive agreements. The practice of several fram-
ers of the Constitution who subsequently became President suggests that
32. Mathews, supra note 16, at 349.
33. S. CRANDALL, supra note 26, at 94-95.
34. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (3d ed. 1971). For a comprehensive definition
of executive agreements based on the powers, rights, and duties of the President, see A.
Ltvrrr, supra note 13, at 45.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress.
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power ..
See Weinfield, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by "Agreements or
Compacts"?, 3 U. CHI. L. REv. 453 (1936). Records of the Constitutional Convention do not
indicate the intended meaning of agreement or compact. Id. at 457. Weinfield, therefore,
asserts that agreement or compact carried a definite meaning for the Constitution's framers
as a technical term taken from the field of international law. Id. At the time the Constitu-
tion was written, these words referred to agreements or compacts regulating and settling
boundary lines. Id. at 464.
36. A. Ltvirr, supra note 13, at 10; see note 24 supra and accompanying text. The
Supreme Court has recognized the contextual distinction between the federal treaty power
and the state agreement power. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 552-53 (1840)
(while states can make agreements with consent of Congress, they can never make treaties).
37. L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 173.
38. For detailed reviews of the proceedings, see Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Do-
main of Foreign/Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL
L. REV. 527 (1974); Levitan, Executive/Agreements: A Study of the Executive in the Control of
the Foreign Relations of the United States, 35 ILL. L. REV. 365, 365-71 (1940); Rovine, Sepa-
ration o Powers and International Executive Agreements, 52 IND. L.J. 397, 409-11 (1977).
39. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (international agreement is not
always treaty requiring Senate participation); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (power to make international agreements that are not treaties in a
"constitutional sense" is "inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality"); see
Levitan, supra note 38, at 371-72 (judicial dictum affirms that the Constitution's framers
contemplated use of international agreements other than treaties); Rovine, supra note 38, at
415 (while legal right of the President to enter executive agreements is well-settled, scope of
Presidential power to conclude such agreements is not).
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the making of executive agreements is not incompatible with the treaty-
making provision.40 Few courts have addressed directly, however, the
question of the origin of the President's power to enter into executive
agreements.4' Thus, the validity of executive agreements must be deter-
mined by examining both constitutional theory and practice.42 Scholars
have classified executive agreements primarily according to the constitu-
tional authority invoked in their making.43 The categories include con-
gressional-executive agreements, treaty authorized agreements, and pure
or sole executive agreements.
Eighty-six per cent of all executive agreements are made pursuant to
existing statutes or are ratified by subsequently enacted statutory author-
ity." These congressional-executive agreements are supported by the rea-
soning that the agreements themselves are constitutional because the
authorizing statute is constitutional.45 The use of congressional-executive
agreements can be traced to George Washington. With the approval of
Congress, Washington authorized the Postmaster General of the United
States to conclude international agreements with foreign nations for the
40. For example, Presidents John Quincy Adams and James Madison both concluded
executive agreements based on either statutory or constitutional authority. See notes 54-56
infra and accompanying text. See also Rovine, supra note 38, at 409-11.
41. The leading Supreme Court cases on executive agreements are Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937); United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953); Consumer's
Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973); Seery v. United States, 127
F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 943 (1959). See Leary, supra note 25, at 5-
6 n.48; Comment, Se/fExecuting Executive Agreements: A Separation of Powers Problem, 24
BUFFALO L. REV. 137, 157 (1974). See also Mathews, supra note 16, at 346 (little case law
exists on the subject of executive agreements, because problems arising from executive
agreements ordinarily do not reach the courts).
42. Leary, supra note 25, at 3.
43. See S. CRANDALL, supra note 26, at 102-40; L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 173-84; A.
L-vrTT, supra note 13, at 46-47; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 188 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 119-121 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)];
Leary, supra note 25, at 3-6.
44. Rovine, supra note 38, at 410. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 43, § 120, Com-
ment a, illustration 1, provides the following example of an executive agreement made pur-
suant to existing statutory authority:
An act of Congress provides that when the President finds that existing du-
ties or import restrictions of the United States or any foreign country are un-
duly burdening or restricting the foreign trade of the United States, he may
enter into trade agreements with foreign governments and proclaim such mod-
ifications of existing duties and other import restrictions as may be necessary
to carry out any such foreign trade agreement, provided that reductions or
increases of any duty rate shall not exceed 50 per cent of any existing rate.
Acting pursuant to that statute, the United States makes an international
agreeement in the form of an executive agreement with state A under which
they reciprocally reduce import duties in the amount of 30 per cent of the
existing rates on an extensive schedule of manufactured goods. This agree-
ment is constitutional, since the Congress in enacting the statute acted pursu-
ant to its power under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations." See Trade Agreements Extension Act of
1958, 72 Stat. 673, 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1958). Cf. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v.
United States, 275 F.2d 472 (C.C. P.A. (Customs) 1959).
45. Rovine, supra note 38, at 410.
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receipt and delivery of mail." Congressional-executive agreements also
have been enacted in the areas of navigation and commerce, international
copyright, trade-marks, and territory acquisition. 47
The second category of executive agreements relates to agreements au-
thorized by existing treaties. 48 Little controversy has arisen over the con-
stitutionality of agreements authorized by treaties, because the Senate's
consent to the treaty encompasses the executive agreement itself.49 Bound-
ary delimitations, rights of transit across foreign territory, and administra-
tive arrangements frequently are covered by this type of executive
agreement. 50
Only two to three per cent of all executive agreements are classified as
pure or sole Presidential agreements.5' A pure executive agreement is
made pursuant to the President's express, independent constitutional pow-
ers.52 Because the Constitution does not explicitly authorize these agree-
ments,53 several issues arise concerning their validity.
The first issue concerns the lack of Senate consent to the agreements.
From the nation's earliest years, Presidents have entered into executive
agreements without first seeking senatorial consent. The earliest pure ex-
ecutive agreements54 include John Quincy Adams's claims settlement with
the Netherlands in 179955 and James Madison's prisoner of war exchange
with Great Britain in 1813.56 In 1817 President James Monroe concluded
the Rush-Bagot Agreement limiting British and American armaments on
the Great Lakes.57 President Monroe submitted the British-American cor-
46. Id.
47. For a comprehensive listing and details of historical congressional-executive agree-
ments, see S. CRANDALL, supra note 26, at 121-40.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 43, § 119, illustration 1, provides the following
example of an executive agreement made pursuant to an existing treaty:
The United States and state A make a security treaty providing, among
other things, that the two states may make administrative agreements gov-
erning the disposition of United States forces in A. Pursuant to that provision,
the President of the United States makes an executive agreement defining ju-
risdiction over United States forces in A. The executive agreement is constitu-
tional. qf. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
49. Leary, supra note 25, at 5.
50. Id.
51. Rovine, supra note 38, at 412. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 43, § 121, illus-
tration 1, provides the following example of an executive afreement made pursuant to the
President's independent constitutional authority: "The President makes an agreement with
state A permitting armed forces of the latter to traverse territory of the United States. The
agreement is valid under the President's powers as chief executive and commander-in-
chief..,
52. Rovine, supra note 38, at 412.
53. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
54. For a discussion of early executive agreements, see Rovine, supra note 38, at 410-11.
55. See notes 96-98 .fra and accompanying text.
56. For the text, relevant documents, and history of the prisoner exchange agreement,
see 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AcTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
557-73 (H. Miller ed. 1931). The agreement provided for the care and transfer of both civil-
ian and military prisoners of war. Id.
57. For the text, relevant documents, and history of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, see 1d.
at 645-57. See also S. CRANDALL, supra note 26, at 102-03.
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respondence pertinent to the agreement to the Senate one year after the
agreement's conclusion and implementation, apparently as a prudent af-
terthought.58 Historical records, however, indicate that President Monroe
actually considered submission to the Senate unnecessary and merely re-
quested that the Senate consider whether the agreement should be treated
as a valid exercise of the President's independent constitutional powers or
as a treaty requiring Senate consent. 59 The Senate subsequently approved
the arrangement by resolution. 60
In addition to Presidential practice, the validity of these agreements is
supported by the fact that the Supreme Court has never declared a pure
executive agreement unconstitutional for lack of Senate consent.6' Legal
scholars widely advocate the recognition of the pure executive agreement
as a constitutionally permissible exercise of the President's total foreign
relations power. 62 Furthermore, the practices of international law suggest
that pure executive agreements are valid. Because the President is the na-
tion's voice in foreign affairs and is considered the representative authority
of the United States under international law, all Presidential acts are sub-
ject to international cognizance. As a result, foreign nations may not ques-
tion the authority of the President to speak and act for the United States.63
Consequently, if the United States repudiated an international executive
agreement relied on by a foreign nation, then the United States would be
committing an international wrong.64
The second important issue that arises concerning pure executive agree-
ments is the scope of the President's power. The goal of a cohesive foreign
policy is to represent the interests of the United States uniformly and to
recognize the nation's responsibility to present foreign policies on which
other countries can rely, while preserving democratic participation in the
formulation of American foreign policy. 65 To achieve this goal, the fed-
eral government must be able to act swiftly, informatively, and often secre-
tively. While Congress is well-equipped to deal with domestic affairs, 66 its
58. S. CRANDALL, supra note 26, at 103.
59. Id. at 102.
60. Id.
61. L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 179. For a discussion of significant cases upholding
executive agreements made without the consent of the Senate, see notes 106-14 infra and
accompanying text.
62. See generally Levitan, supra note 38; Mathews, supra note 16; Rovine, supra note
38. .RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 43, § 121 provides: "An international agreement
made by the United States as an executive agreement without reference to a treaty or act of
Congress may. . . deal with any matter that under the Constitution falls within the in-
dependent powers of the President." For a discussion of the President's constitutional for-
eign relations power, see notes 8-23 supra and accompanying text.
63. Levitan, supra note 38, at 392.
64. Id. at 394; see United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (quoting James
Madison as saying that to allow state law to counteract a treaty "would bring on the Union
the just charge of national perfidy").
65. Mathews, supra note 16, at 345.
66. Id. at 374. Friction among the three branches of government and within the Con-
gress over domestic issues slows the decision-making process and facilitates compromise.
Thus, domestic policy makers are responsive to the nation as a whole. Id.
[Vol. 351062
deliberative and frequently cumbersome decision-making process is ill-
suited to the exigencies of an effective foreign policy mechanism. The
President, on the other hand, is better able to deal with foreign policy by
avoiding the friction and delay inherent in most congressional action.67
Although the President's executive agreement power must be broad
enough to meet these needs, it is not absolute. The scope of the President's
agreement power, as with any other federal government power, is inher-
ently limited by the Constitution68 and the separation of powers doc-
trine.6 9 Furthermore, the practical limitations of public opinion, political
forces, and the President's dependency on a good working relationship
with Congress act to mitigate potentially excessive exercises of the execu-
tive agreement power. 70
Commentators have determined the scope of the President's agreement
power through a case-by-case delineation method, taking into account the
exigencies of modern international relations and the inherent limitations
on executive agreements. 71 The case delineation method leaves the Presi-
dent free to exercise his foreign relations power according to the extent to
which current events justify it.7 2 In times of crisis the need for swift action
may require a broader Presidential agreement power to further the best
interests or even the survival of the nation.73 During less critical times the
need for a broad scope of Presidential power is balanced by the desirability
of employing the treaty-making power to solidify the goals of the nation in
the international area by having both Presidential and congressional ap-
proval in foreign policy implementation. 74
The arguments favoring a broad Presidential agreement power have not
67. Id. at 374-75.
68. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957). RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 43,
§ 117(l)(b) provides that the United States can make international agreements if "the agree-
ment does not contravene any of the limitations of the Constitution applicable to all powers
of the United States." Direct reference to the Bill of Rights as a limitation on international
agreements is made in the comment to § 117. Id. Comment d. Executive agreements are
within the scope of § 117. Id. § 121. For the text of § 121, see note 61 supra. See also
Mathews, supra note 16, at 377; Comment, supra note 41, at 141.
69. Comment, supra note 36, at 141; see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952). In Youngstown the Court held invalid President Truman's executive order
directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize the nation's steel mills during a nationwide
strike. Id. at 589. Justice Black ruled for the Court that the President's power, if any, to
order the steel mill seizure must derive from either the Constitution or an act of Congress.
Id. at 585. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, however, examined the broader issue of
Presidential authority to act in any given situation. Justice Jackson stated that the President
may act pursuant to congressional authorization, he may act in the absence of congressional
authorization, or he may act in contravention of congressional will. Id. at 637. According to
Justice Jackson, Presidential authority is at its strongest when Congress authorizes the Presi-
dent's actions, and Presidential authority is at its weakest when Congress prohibits the Presi-
dent's actions. Id.
70. Mathews, supra note 16, at 377.
71. Id. at 375; see text accompanying note 205 infra. See generally L. HENKIN, supra
note 8, at 179; Rovine, supra note 38, at 417-21.
72. Mathews, upra note 16, at 375.
73. Id.
74. See id ("the extent of the President's power in foreign affairs must vary with the
context of events in which it must be exercised").
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gone unchallenged. Strict constructionists of the Constitution challenge
the notion that the Constitution itself is the source of the power.75 Citing
the Constitution's inclusion of the treaty-making power and its omission of
the agreement power, one strict constructionist argues that the founding
fathers, who distrusted executive power, intended to withhold from the
President the power to negotiate and enter into international agreements
by himself.76 This critic further argues that the original states jealously
guarded their power to participate equally in making treaties through their
representatives in the Senate.77 The strict constructionist asserts that de-
ciding the validity of executive agreements by case delineation allows the
President unilaterally to revise the Constitution by his own actions. Thus,
if the President is allowed to circumvent congressional participation in the
treaty process frequently enough, he effectively amends the Constitution
and transfers power from the legislative to the executive domain.78
Other critics accept the validity of the President's agreement power, but
assert that the power is too often exercised when a treaty would be more
appropriate. 79 These critics point to the large and ever increasing number
of executive agreements that have been executed since 1946 as an abroga-
tion of the treaty-making power.80 Reasons other than an executive abuse
of discretion for the increased number of agreements are advanced in sup-
port of a broad executive agreement power. The increase in the number of
world nations, the increased participation of the United States in world
affairs, the increase in the variety of agreement subject matter, and the
inclusion of executive agency arrangements in the executive agreement
definition offer alternative explanations for the increased use of executive
agreements."
The amount and severity of criticism of executive agreements generally
depends on the political climate.8 2 The quantum of respect and esteem
that the public holds for the President and the level of trust existing be-
tween the executive and legislative branches also affect the amount of criti-
cism directed towards executive agreements.8 3 When the public doubts the
75. See generally Berger, supra note 20; Comment, supra note 20. Strict constructionists
rely heavily on, and find their strongest argument against the executive agreement power in,
the records of the Constitutional Convention. Eg., Berger, supra note 20, at 10-12. But see
L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 421 n.5 (argument that Constitution only permits international
agreements by treaty is dead).
76. Berger, supra note 20, at 41.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 49-50.
79. See, e.g., Rovine, supra note 38, at 398-99 (noting criticism by members of
Congress).
80. During its first 50 years the nation entered into 60 treaties and 27 published execu-
tive agreements. Leary, supra note 25, at 3. By 1940, new treaties totalled 800, and new
executive agreements totalled 1200. Id. Between 1940-1955, new treaties numbered 139,
while new published executive agreements totalled 1950. Id. Between 1946-1973, new trea-
ties totalled 368, and the number of new international agreements other than treaties stood
at 5,590. Id.
81. Rovine, supra note 38, at 406-07.




propriety and course of the President's foreign policy actions, it is more
likely to attack the President's foreign relations power.84 When Congress
and the President hold diverse views on substantive foreign policy issues,
Congress may challenge the relative roles of the two branches in the treaty
and agreement process.85
An alternative means of upholding Presidential power over foreign af-
fairs is abstention, based on the political question doctrine.8 6 Were it so
inclined, the Supreme Court easily could cite prudential reasons for not
interfering in the conduct of foreign affairs: the fact that foreign affairs
clearly is not within the purview of the judicial branch, the fact that in-
volving the Court in such questions might be perceived as expressing disre-
spect for the other branches of government, the lack of judicially
manageable standards for making the decision, and the reality that the
Court would be hard-pressed to enforce its mandate.8 7 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court rarely has invoked the doctrine in such circumstances,88
choosing instead to resolve the cases on the merits of the President's claim
to constitutional power.89 Occasionally, however, the Court has displayed
its ability to avoid deciding at all, thus reaching the same result as if it had
deferred on political question grounds. In a series of cases in the 1970s
challenging the President's conduct of the Vietnam War, the Court simply
affirmed or denied certiorari.9° Consequently, the contours of the political
84. Id. For example, the Vietnam War controversy, the Watergate issues, and the gen-
eral behavior of the Nixon administration gave rise to the Case Act in the early 1970s. Id.
The Case Act requires that international agreements other than treaties be submitted to the
Congress within 60 days after the agreement has entered into force. 1 U.S.C. § 112 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). The agreements are not submitted for congressional approval. Rather, the
submission serves the purpose of keeping Congress informed as to the President's executive
agreement activity. Rovine, supra note 38, at 401-02. See generally Casper, Constitutional
Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: 4 Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI.
L. REv. 463 (1976); Kutner, Due Process of Foreign Policy. Proposalsfor Presidential Guide-
lines, 6 LAW. AMERICAS 346 (1974).
85. See Leary, supra note 25, at 4-5. For discussion of proposals to require subsequent
legislative approval or disapproval of executive agreements, see Rovine, supra note 38, at
421-31. See generally Sparkman, Checks and Balances in American Foreign Policy, 52 IND.
L.J. 433 (1977).
86. The Supreme Court described a political question in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
217 (1962), as:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impos-
sibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
87. See id.
88. See L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 213; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YoUNG, supra
note 43, at 180; Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Fundamental nalysi,
75 YALE LJ. 517, 542 (1966).
89. See L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 213; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra
note 43, at 180.
90. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936
(1974); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Atlee v.
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question doctrine in foreign affairs are not at all clear.91 As a result, chal-
lenges to Presidential activity remain subject to two defenses: (1) that the
action is within the executive's constitutional powers, and (2) that
whatever the extent of the President's powers, the Court should not
interfere.
C The President's Power to Settle Claims
International law does not recognize an individual citizen or his claim
against a foreign state or its citizens. 92 In theory the citizen's claim belongs
to his government, just as the corresponding debt belongs to the govern-
ment of the debtor. Thus, the claim and debt between individuals become
a claim and debt between governments and serve as valuable bargaining
chips in international negotiations.93 Government ownership of individ-
ual claims and debts has established the international agreement as an in-
tegral part of the international claims settlement mechanism. 94 The
United States has participated in many such claims settlement
agreements. 95
Historically, the President's right to conduct all negotiations with for-
eign states placed him in the best position to settle international claims on
behalf of American citizens. 96 The President's participation in this claims
settlement process can be traced to 1799 when President John Quincy Ad-
ams negotiated and concluded the Wilmington Packet with the Nether-
lands.97 Acting to settle the claim of an American citizen for a seized ship
and its cargo, President Adams established the earliest precedent for settle-
ment of claims agreements without Senate approval. 98 The practice is now
well-established, as Presidents repeatedly have asserted the authority to
settle the claims of American citizens by executive agreement.99 During
Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911
(1973).
91. See Thomas & Thomas, supra note 21, at 891-94.
92. L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 262.
93. Id. Governments traditionally have treated these claims as national assets so that
the claims can be used for bargaining in international dealings. Id.
94. The Supreme Court articulated and applied this international claims doctrine in
United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1876). See Simpson, The Use of Executive
Agreements in the Settlement of International Reclamations, 8 DET. L. REv. 23, 23-24 (1938)
(redress must be sought through claimant's own government before international tribunal
will recognize claims).
95. See note 99 iMfra. In United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 240 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring), Justice Frankfurter stated that the President's authority to settle claims long has
been recognized as evidenced by practice. For discussion of United States Y. Pink, see notes
110-14 infra and accompanying text.
96. S. CRANDALL, supra note 26, at 108; note 27 supra and accompanying text.
97. Rovine, supra note 38, at 410. For the text, relevant documents, and history of the
Wilmington Packet, see 5 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AcTs OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 1075-1103 (H. Miller ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as 5 TREATIES].
98. Rovine, supra note 38, at 410-11 n.65 (quoting 5 TREATIES, supra note 97, at 1079).
99. Lillich, The Gravel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974. Congress
Checkmates a Presidential Lump Sum Agreement, 69 Am. J. INT'L L. 738, 844 (1975). The
afreement may take the form of an exchange of notes, a protocol, or memorandum, and is
binding when completed by the President or the President's representative. Simpson, supra
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the nineteenth century treaties were the most common form of reclamation
agreement.100 Since World War II, however, the President almost exclu-
sively has exercised the executive agreement power to settle claims.' 0 As
a practical matter, if congressional appropriations do not appear necessary,
the State Department settles claims without the consent of the Senate.' 0 2
Moreover, Congress rarely has challenged the President's authority to set-
tle claims by executive agreement. 10 3
Although the evolution of the President's power to settle claims has
stemmed primarily from usage, the Supreme Court has upheld the consti-
tutionality of the power both in United States v. Belmont'04 and United
States v. Pink. 0 5 In Belmont the Court addressed a challenge to the Litvi-
nov Assignment. °0 The controversy arose when the United States, pursu-
ant to that assignment, sought to recover funds deposited by a Russian
corporation in a New York bank. Previously, the Soviet Union had na-
tionalized the corporation and appropriated all its assets and property. In
agreeing to the Litvinov Assignment, the President of the United States
reached a claims settlement with the Soviets wherein that Government as-
signed all its claims against American citizens to the United States Gov-
ernment. The Soviets relinquished all rights to pursue the claims
themselves. Concluding the agreement without the consent of the Senate,
the President also officially recognized and established diplomatic rela-
tions with the Soviet Government. Though the issue on appeal focused on
whether the agreement could override New York public policy, 10 7 the
Court also addressed the constitutionality of the Presidential claims settle-
ment process. Significantly, the Court in Belmont viewed the recognition
note 94, at 35-36. Those claims not definitely settled by executive agreement are submitted
to arbitration commissions under Presidential authority. Id. at 37-38; Levitan, supra note
38, at 382. For examples of agreements for settlement by arbitration or by definitive settle-
ment, see S. CRANDALL, supra note 26, at 108-11; Hyde, Agreements of the United States
Other Than Treaties, 17 THE GREEN BAG 229, 237-38 (1905).
100. Lillich, supra note 99, at 845.
101. Id. The Supreme Court in Dames & Moore noted that Presidents have completed at
least 10 binding claims settlement agreements with foreign nations since 1952. Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2987, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918, 940 (1981); the agreements are cited
at id. n.9.
102. 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (1970).
103. Lillich, supra note 99, at 846. Lillich discusses the Gravel Amendment, a rare ex-
ample of congressional interference with the claims settlement process. In passing the
Gravel Amendment, Congress blocked a lump sum settlement with Czechoslovakia on be-
half of United States claimants. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2438 (1976) (commonly
referred to as the Gravel Amendment).
104. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
105. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
106. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, Publication of the Department of State No. 528, Eastern European Series, No. 1 (1933).
For details of events surrounding the exchange of notes and the agreement's implementa-
tion, see W. CowLEs, TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PROPERTY INTERFERENCES
AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW 275-76 (1941).
107. 301 U.S. at 327. The respondents argued that New York public policy prohibited
the act of confiscation that would occur if the United States enforced the Russian nationali-
zation decree. Id. The Court, however, ruled that international executive agreements take
precedence over state policy. Id.
19821 1067
1068 SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35
of the Soviet Government, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and
the claims assignment as elements of a single transaction. 108 The Court
noted the President's independent power to "speak as the sole organ" in
foreign affairs and concluded that no doubt existed as to the President's
authority to enter into the claims settlement, without the consent of the
Senate, as part of the total agreement. °9
Soon after Belmont the Court again considered the Litvinov Assignment
in United States v. Pink.110 Reasoning that the President's power to recog-
nize foreign governments carries the authority to remove obstacles to full
recognition,"'I the Court reaffirmed its position in Belmont that the recog-
nition of the Soviet Government and the claims settlement constituted a
single agreement.1 2 Outstanding claims were an obstacle to full recogni-
tion, 113 and the Court in Pink ruled that the "[p]ower to remove such ob-
stacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals . . .
certainly is a modest implied power of the President who is the 'sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations.' "114
Commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's reasoning in the Bel-
mont and Pink decisions. They argue that the extension of the power to
establish diplomatic relations, which in turn is based on the narrow Presi-
dential power to receive ambassadors, is both overly extensive and unwar-
ranted. 15 This viewpoint is supported by the fact that the resolution of the
principle issue in both Belmont and Pink, whether the executive agreement
could override state policy, did not require the Court to interpret the reach
of the power to receive ambassadors."16
108. Id. at 330. The Court labelled the unified transaction an "international compact."
Id.
109. Id. The Court noted that "an international compact, such as this was, is not always
a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate." Id. The Court further found that
the claims assignment did not confiscate private property in violation of the fifth amend-
ment. Id. at 332. The Court stated that the Constitution's protections are not extraterrito-
rial. Therefore, redress for foreign citizens whose own country has taken their property must
lie with their own government. Id. For treatment of fifth amendment limitations on claims
settlement agreements, see notes 121-31 infra and accompanying text.
110. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
111. Id. at 229. The President recognizes a foreign government when he exercises his
constitutional power to receive ambassadors. Therefore, by implication the President is
deemed to have the power to recognize foreign governments through other means. A.
LtivrrT, supra note 13, at 21. But see L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 41 (receiving ambassadors
is more a function to be performed by a figurehead than a power).
112. 315 U.S. at 230. The Court ruled, as it had in Belmont, that the Litvinov Assign-
ment, an executive agreement, was valid without the participation or consent of the Senate.
Id. at 229.
113. Id. at 229.
114. Id. (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936)).
115. See, e.g., Ohly, Advice and Consent: International Executive Claims Settlement
Agreements, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 271, 282 (1975). For an extensive, critical examination of
the Belmont and Pink decisions, see A. Ltvrrr, supra note 13, at 21-38.
116. Ohly, supra note 115, at 282. Ohly reviews the respective roles of the Congress and
the President in international claims settlement. Advocating that the legislative and execu-
tive branches share the settlement power concurrently, he concludes that the Presidential
power to settle claims pursuant to the recognition of foreign governments is not sufficient
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Despite criticism of the Supreme Court's expansive reasoning in both
Belmont and Pink, lower courts have relied on these cases to extend fur-
ther the President's power to settle claims. In Ozanic v. United Statesl" 7
the Second Circuit upheld the implied constitutional power of the Presi-
dent to settle claims between the United States and a foreign government.
Unlike the agreement in Belmont and Pink, however, the settlement agree-
ment in Ozanic did not coincide with the recognition of a foreign govern-
ment. 8 Although the Court acknowledged this factual difference from
Belmont and Pink, it could find no reason to restrict the claims settlement
power to incidents of government recognition. 19 Rather, the court rea-
soned that the continued amity between nations necessitated such
settlements. ' 20
Executive claims settlement agreements are subject to the constitutional
prohibitions against government activity that infringes on the rights of in-
dividuals.' 2 1 Although executive settlement agreements theoretically
could be attacked through the fifth amendment prohibition against the
taking of private property for public purposes without just compensa-
tion, 22 the Supreme Court never has invalidated a claims settlement
agreement on fifth amendment grounds. 123 Nevertheless, the fifth amend-
ment protection against government taking of private property without just
compensation remains an issue in claims settlement practice.' 24
When the settlement calls for a lump sum payment 125 or arbitration, the
United States generally agrees to the payment or arbitration without the
legal authority to preclude Congress from exercising its own settlement powers. Id. at 282-
83.
117. 188 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951).
118. Id. at 229-30. The case involved a maritime collision claim against the United
States released by Yugoslavia in a lend-lease settlement.
119. Id. at 231.
120. Id. Ozanic was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2988-89, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918, 9427(1981).
121. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
122. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
123. L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 263. The claims settlement may be challenged as to the
details of aparticular settlement, the procedure used in paying private claimants, or the
congressional provision or nonprovision of award and payment. Id. Henkin theorizes that
the Court's failure to scrutinize any settlement for fifth amendment violations may be be-
cause the Court does not consider the settlement a "taking." Rather, the Court, relyin& on
principles of international law, considers the government, not the claimant, to be the claim's
owner. The Court also possibly considers the settlement a nonjusticiable political question.
Id. at 263-64; see notes 86-91 supra and accompanying text.
124. The French Spoilition Claims in the early nineteenth century exemplify the fifth
amendment issue. By treaty, in 1800, the United States waived the claims of American
shipowners against France in return for forgiveness of an alleged treaty breach by the
United States. The United States had taken the shipholders' claims to nullify claims against
the United States for the good of the nation. Congress, however, did not appropriate com-
pensation funds until 1883. See Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886); L. HENUKN,
supra note 8, at 263. See also W. COWLES, supra note 100, at 211-19.
125. Under such a settlement the United States terminates the individual American
claims in exchange for a lump sum payment by the foreign nation. L. HENKIN, supra note 8,
at 262. Congress established the International Claims Commission to determine the interest
of each individual American claimant in lump sum settlement funds. International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1976).
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consent of the claimants. 126 Often a lump sum payment settlement will
have a confiscatory impact on the claims, because the settlement is for less
than the value at stake.' 27 An unfavorable lump sum settlement or an
agreement to arbitration may occur when national interests in continuing
relations with a foreign state and other political considerations take prece-
dence over the individual claimants' economic interests.' 28 The claimants
under a lump sum payment agreement receive little sympathy from the
courts, possibly because they are more often considered recipients of a
windfall, rather than as individuals deprived of legal rights.' 29
II. THE IRANIAN CLAIMS SUSPENSION LITIGATION
The issues relevant to the Presidential claims settlement power have re-
ceived recent judicial consideration in the Iranian claims suspension litiga-
tion. The facts giving rise to Dames & Moore v. Regan 130 illustrate the
context and basis for much of the Iranian assets litigation concerning the
President's suspension of American claims.'31 On November 4, 1979, Ira-
nian militants seized the American Embassy in Tehran, taking the diplo-
matic staff hostage. President Jimmy Carter declared a national
emergency on November 14, 1979, pursuant to the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)132 and froze all Iranian assets within
the jurisdiction of the United States. '3 3 On November 26, 1979, the Presi-
dent issued regulations specially licensing certain judicial proceedings
against Iran, but prohibiting any entry of judgment in those proceed-
ings. 134 Dames & Moore, a California engineering firm, brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Central District of California
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 43, § 213: "The President may waive or
settle a claim against a foreign state based on the responsibility of the foreign state for any
injury to a United States national, without the consent of such national." See also notes 92-
94 supra and accompanying text.
127. Ohly, supra note 115, at 274 n.21. A review of 10 recent settlement programs ad-
ministered by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission reveals that the indemnification
of the claimants averaged 35.47% of the amount awarded and 6.61% of the total amount
claimed. Id. Moreover, delays in settlement payment and the effects of inflation make the
compensation even more inadequate. Id.
128. L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 263; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 43, § 213,
Reporter's Note.
129. Lillich, supra note 99, at 846.
130. 101 S. Ct. 2972, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918 (1981).
131. The authority of the President to nullify judicial attachments of Iranian assets and
to direct the transfer of Iranian assets also was at issue in Dames & Moore. Id. at 2982-84,
69 L. Ed. 2d at 934-37. The Court concluded that the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. III 1979), provided the authorization for the
President to take these actions. 101 S. Ct. at 2984, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 937.
132. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. III 1979). The declaration of a national emergency
under the IEEPA required a finding that the Iranian crisis constituted an "unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United
States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the Umted States." Id. § 1701.
133. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (1919). The President isued the order
pursuant to presidential power under the IEEPA. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(l)(B) (Supp. III
1979).
134. 44 Fed. Reg. 67617 (1979); see 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.101-.904 (1981) for current regula-
tions governing the control of Iranian assets.
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against the Iranian Government, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,
and several Iranian banks on December 19, 1979.135 Dames & Moore al-
leged that the Atomic Energy Organization owed it $3,436,694.30 plus in-
terest for services rendered under a contract with a subsidiary to conduct a
nuclear power plant site selection study in Iran.' 36 Subsequently, the dis-
trict court issued attachment orders against the defendants' property to se-
cure any further judgment against them. 137
On January 19, 1981, the United States made final the agreement with
Iran securing the release of the hostages. 38 Stating that the purpose of the
United States and Iran was to terminate all litigation between the two
Governments and their nationals,139 the agreement provided for an Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal' 4° authorized to conduct final and binding
arbitration on all such claims.' 4 1 Accordingly, the United States agreed to
terminate all legal proceedings in its own courts 42 and to transfer back all
Iranian assets held in the United States except for one billion dollars. That
money was to be placed in escrow to satisfy Claims Tribunal awards
against Iran. 43 On January 19, 1981, President Carter implemented the
agreement through a series of executive orders' 44 that included a nullifica-
tion of judicial attachment orders 45 and a directive to initiate the transfer
of Iranian assets. 46
On April 28, 1981, Dames & Moore challenged the enforcement of the
agreement, the implementing orders, and the regulations.' 47 The district
135. 101 S. Ct. at 2979, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 930.
136. Id.
137. Id.138. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
139. Agreement I, supra note 2, B.
140. Agreement II, supra note 2, art II, 1: "An International Arbitral Tribunal (the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) is hereby established for the purpose of deciding claims
of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the
United States ...."
141. Id. art. IV, 1: "All decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and binding."
142. Agreement I, supra note 2, B: "[Tihe United States agrees to terminate all legal
proceedings in the United States courts involving claims of United States persons and insti-
tutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments [and]
to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims .
143. Id. Points II-III, §§ 2-9.
144. Exec. Order Nos. 12,276-12,285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913 (1981).
145. Exec. Order No. 12,277, 46 Fed. Reg. 7915 (1981). The President ordered the revo-
cation of the license authorizing attachment of the frozen Iranian assets and nullification of
the attachments made pursuant to that license. Id.
146. Exec. Order No. 12,279, 46 Fed. Reg. 7919 (1981). The President ordered all banks
holding Iranian assets to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in prepa-
ration for their return to Iran. Id. On Feb. 24, 1981, President Ronald Reagan ratified the
Carter executive orders. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981). Relevant
Treasury Department regulations followed. Treas. Reg. § 535 (1981). The Reagan order
also suspends all claims "except as they may be presented to the tribunal." Exec. Order No.
12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111, 14,111 (1981). Accordino to the order, the claims had no legal
effect in the United States courts durin the suspension period, suspension of a particular
claim terminated if the Tribunal determined it did not have jurisdiction, and the Tribunal's
decision on the merits of a claim operated as a final resolution and discharge of the claims
for all purposes. Id.
147. 101 S. Ct. at 2980, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 932. Dames & Moore sought declaratory and
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court denied a motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.' 48
Subsequently, Dames & Moore appealed to the Ninth Circuit and sought a
writ of certiorari before judgment because of the rapidly approaching June
19, 1981, deadline for the transfer of Iranian assets.' 49 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and adopted an accelerated review
schedule due to the significance of the issues and the demand for prompt
resolution.' 50
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court noted that the contradicting
opinions of the lower courts in the Iranian assets litigation merited a clari-
fying statement on the relevant issues by the Supreme Court. 5' For exam-
ple, in Marschalk Co. v. Iran NationalAirlines Corp. 152 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the Presi-
dent lacked the authority to suspend an advertising agency's breach of
contract claim against the Iranian national airline. 53 After determining
that the President did not have the express or implied authority under the
IEEPA to suspend the litigation of the claims in the United States court, '54
the court addressed the question of the President's constitutional author-
ity.' 55 Noting that by definition a settlement means that the claimants re-
ceive something of value in exchange for terminating United States court
proceedings on their claims, the Marschalk court reasoned that the agree-
ment did not constitute a settlement.' 56 The court contended that the
injunctive relief against the United States and the Secretary of Treasury. Id. Previously, the
district court had granted Dames & Moore's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 2980, 69
L. Ed. 2d at 931-32. The court, however, later stayed the execution of judgment because of
the relevant Executive Orders. Id., 69 L. Ed. 2d at 932. As a result, Dames & Moore sought
relief on the grounds that the President and Secretary of the Treasury had exceeded their
constitutional and statutory authority in implementing the agreement. Id.
148. Id., 69 L. Ed. 2d at 932.
149. Id. at 2981, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 932; see Agreement II, smpra note 2, art. I.
150. 101 S. Ct. at 2981, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 932-33.
151. Id. at 2977, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 928.
152. 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and remanded, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981). The
Second Circuit previously had remanded 96 Iranian assets cases to the district court with
instructions to determine the validity of the President's actions in nullifying the attachments
and suspending the claims. New Eng. Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co., 646 F.2d 779, 784-85 (2d Cir. 1981). The district court chose Marschalk
as the case most appropriate to the resolution of the issue. 518 F. Supp. at 75-76.
153. 518 F. Supp. at 91-92.
154. Id. at 78-81. The court noted that pursuant to the IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B)
(Supp. III 1979), the President has the power in a national emergency to regulate foreign
property located in the United States. 518 F. Supp. at 78. The court concluded, therefore,
that because Marschalk's claim was an effort to establish a contractual right to compensation
irrespective of the location of Iranian property, it was not amenable to Presidential regula-
tion under the IEEPA. Id. at 79. Moreover, the court found that the legislative history of
the IEEPA limited Presidential power to economic regulation in times of national emer-
gency. It did not, the court concluded, expand that power to include the seizure of property
or e benefit of the United States. Id. at 79-80. The court also found that Congress, pursu-
ant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act [FSIA], 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976),
intended to prohibit the President from interfering in litigation by American citizens against
foreign defendants. 518 F. Supp. at 81-83.
155. 518 F. Supp. at 85-92.
156. Id. at 88.
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claimants had not yet received pecuniary satisfaction for their claims, 57
and had lost their access to United States courts and the corresponding due
process safeguards, including the right to appeal.-58 The court determined
that successful claimants probably would recover only twenty cents for
every dollar claimed, because the total claims against Iran exceed the
amount in the settlement fund by five times. 159 Furthermore, the court
could not find any evidence that Iran had given up any consideration in
the agreement other than the release of the hostages.' 60 The court in Mar-
schalk therefore concluded that the hostage crisis, rather than the claims of
American citizens, had been settled by the agreement.' 61
Assuming arguendo that a settlement occurred, the Marschalk court
went on to discuss whether the President had the constitutional authority
to conclude such a settlement to secure the hostages' release.' 62 The court
distinguished the Belmont and Pink cases as standing for the President's
authority to enter executive agreements vital to the recognition of a foreign
government, but not for the President's power to use the private claims of
citizens for bargaining purposes in international agreements.' 63 In addi-
tion to a lack of judicial precedent, the President's action, the court noted,
violated the separation of powers doctrine.'6 Reasoning that the Con-
gress holds the power to grant jurisdiction to the courts, the Marschalk
court concluded that the President usurped this power by depriving the
courts of congressionally legislated jurisdiction over the Iranian assets
claims.' 65 Finally, the court in Marschalk found that the agreement vio-
lated the fifth amendment prohibition against the taking of private prop-
erty for public purposes without just compensation. 66 The court based
this determination on a finding that the termination of a right to enforce a
contract constituted a taking 67 and that the adjudication before the Tribu-
nal did not guarantee just compensation.' 68
Although the Marschalk court resolved the claims suspension issue in
favor of the claimant, other lower courts found that the President had the
authority to take such action. In Charles T Main International, Inc. v. Ky-
uzestan Water & Power Authority169 the First Circuit Court of Appeals




160. Id. The court noted that in the agreement Iran could not give up its sovereign
immunity defense because that defense had never been available. Id. Furthermore, the
establishment of a settlement fund did not operate as consideration because it made up only
a minor portion of the attached assets sacrificed by the claimants. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 89-90.
163. Id.; see notes 104-16 supra and accompanying text.
164. 518 F. Supp. at 90-92.
165. Id. at 91.
166. Id. at 93-94; see notes 121-29 supra and accompanying text.
167. 518 F. Supp. at 93.
168. Id. at 93-94; see text accompanying note 159 supra.
169. 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981).
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engineering firm seeking payment for services rendered in Boston and Iran
on Iranian electrification projects.' 70 Finding that the IEEPA could not
provide the statutory authority for the Presidential claims suspension,' 71
the First Circuit relied on the President's long-accepted, inherent constitu-
tional power to settle the claims of American nationals.' 72 The court con-
cluded that the need to maintain a flexible Presidential power to resolve
international disputes necessitated continued recognition of the claims set-
tlement authority. 173 Accordingly, the submission of private claims
against Iran to the Arbitral Tribunal constituted an appropriate settle-
ment.174 Furthermore, the First Circuit could find no Presidential interfer-
ence with the jurisdiction of the courts, because a binding settlement did
not result in a dismissal of the claim for lack of jurisdiction. 75 Rather, the
court stated that the compelled dismissal resulted from a failure to state a
claim for relief.' 76
Similarly, in American International Group, Inc. v. Iran 77 the District of
Columbia Circuit found that the claims suspension did not modify the ju-
risdiction of the courts.' 78 Instead, the court ruled that the President, in
light of long-standing practice, had the inherent authority to modify sub-
stantive law in settling the international claims of American citizens by
international agreement. 79 The court considered the suspension, as op-
posed to the cancellation, of the claims' 80 and the provision of the Tribu-
nal as an alternative forum to be determinative factors.'18 Moreover, the
court noted that the Congress's failure to disapprove of the President's ac-
tions enhanced the validity of the agreement and its corresponding execu-
tive orders.' 82 Finally, the courts in both Charles T Main and American
International Group agreed that issues flowing from the taking clause183
were not yet ripe for adjudication.' 84
The Supreme Court's accelerated action in Dames & Moore succeeded
170. Id. at 814.
171. Id. at 809. This ruling was in agreement with the Marschalk court's ruling on the
same issue. See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
172. 651 F.2d at 810-13.
173. Id. at 812-13.
174. Id. at 814.
175. Id. at 810.
176. Id.
177. 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
178. Id. at 440-42.
179. Id. at 443-45. But see Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69,
83-84 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and remanded, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981) (the distinction by the.Amer-
ican Int'l Group court between suspension of litigation as a jurisdictional modification and
claims suspension as a substantive law modification is difficult to understand).
180. 657 F.2d at 447-48.
181. Id. at 447.
182. Id. at 445; see note 103 supra and accompanying text.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
184. The court in Charles T Main concluded that it was impossible to determine if the
provision of an international tribunal constituted an inferior alternative to the previously
available American courts such that a taking had occurred. 651 F.2d at 814-15. The court
in American Int'l Group held that the court could not be assured the claimants would suffer
loss. 657 F.2d at 447.
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these conflicting lower court decisions. Because of the significance and ex-
igencies of the situation, however, the Court qualified its decision as being
narrowly confined to the interpretation of the Iranian hostage agree-
ment. 185 The Court cautioned that the decision did not provide rules or
guidelines to be followed in other situations. 186 Initially, Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for a unanimous Court, reviewed the IEEPA. The Court
concluded that the IEEPA provided the authority for the President to nul-
lify the claimants' post-November 14, 1979, attachments and to order the
transfer of the Iranian assets in preparation for their return to Iran. 187 The
Court, however, found that the IEEPA could not be interpreted as authori-
zation for the President's claims suspension.'8 8 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court reasoned that the private American claims against Iran did
not constitute Iranian property transactions. 18 9 As a result, the Court
agreed with the lower courts that these efforts to establish liability fell
outside the authority of the President to regulate under the IEEPA.190 The
Court also declined to find the statutory authority for the claims suspen-
sion in the Hostage Act of 1868.191 Yet, the Court found that Congress
intended, through both the IEEPA and the Hostage Act, to allow the Presi-
dent broad discretion in times of international crisis. 192 Thus, the two stat-
utes proved relevant to the Court's determination of whether the President
acted alone in effecting the claims settlement, or with the implied assent of
Congress.193
The Court concluded that Congress historically had acquiesced to the
President's settlement of international claims by executive agreement and
that it implicitly had approved such practice.' 94 Noting the prevalence of
such acquiescence in the past, the Court cited the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949 as Congress's way of marking such agreements
with congressional approval, 195 Specifically, the Court remarked that
Congress had not acted in any way to disapprove or resist the agreement
settling the American claims against Iran.196 The Court found further sup-
port for the President's actions in prior Supreme Court decisions that rec-
185. 101 S. Ct. at 2977, 2991, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 928, 945-46.
186. Id. at 2977, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 928.
187. Id. at 2984, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 937.
188. Id.; see note 171 supra and accompanying text.
189. 101 S. Ct. at 2984-85, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 937.
190. Id. at 2985, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 937.
191. Id. The Hostage Act of 1868 provides the President with authority to take necessary
actions, short of war, to secure the release of any American citizen held unjustly by a foreign
government. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976). The Court refused to apply the statute to the Iranian
hostage crisis because Congress intended it to apply only when foreign governments refused
to recognize the citizenship of naturalized Americans travelling abroad. 101 S. Ct. at 2985,
69 L. Ed. 2d at 938.
192. 101 S. Ct. at 2985, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 938.
193. Id. at 2985-86, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 938-39.
194. Id. at 2987, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 939-40.
195. Id. at 2987-88, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 941; see note 125 supra.
196. 101 S. Ct. at 2991, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 945. The Court noted that Congress could have
enacted legislation affecting the agreement's enforcement or passed a resolution expressing
disapproval of the agreement. Id.
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ognized the executive agreement power. 97 The Court also approved the
Arbitral Tribunal as an appropriate and traditional means of attaining a
claims settlement because the claimants had received something of value,
an international tribunal, in exchange for the suspension of their claims in
American courts. 198
In response to Dames & Moore's argument that the President had vio-
lated the separation of powers, the Court determined that the President
had not modified the jurisdiction of the federal courts in suspending the
claims.' 99 The Court ruled that the President merely had modified the
applicable substantive law by exercising the power to settle claims.200 Fi-
nally, the Court refused to consider whether the claims suspension consti-
tuted a violation of the fifth amendment prohibition against the taking of
private property without just compensation, because the issue was not ripe
for adjudication.20 1
Thus, the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan upheld the power
of the President to suspend the claims of American nationals against Iran
in order to achieve a resolution to the Iranian hostage crisis. 20 2 Relying on
its prior decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,20 3 the Court
noted that "a systematic, unbroken executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of Congress and never before questioned. . . may be treated
as a gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in the President by § I of Art. 11."204
Although the Court attempted to limit the precedential effect of the Dames
& Moore decision, the Court's recognition of a gloss on Presidential power
in upholding the President's actions resolving the Iranian hostage crisis has
precedential implications.
The exigencies of the Iranian hostage crisis possibly influenced the
197. Id. at 2988-89, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 942-43. The Court cited the Belmont, Pink, and
Ozanic cases with approval. Id.; see notes 106-20 supra and accompanying text.
198. 101 S. Ct. at 2990-91, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 944-45. But see notes 156-61 supra for the
Marschalk court's treatment of the question.
199. 101 S. Ct. at 2989, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 943. But see the Marschalk court's treatment of
this question at notes 164-65 supra and accompanying text.
200. 101 S. Ct. at 2989, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 943. The Court discussed the FSIA in light of this
issue. The Court concluded that the FSIA, which was intended to remove barriers to com-
mercial litigation in federal courts against foreign states waiving sovereign immunity, did
not bar the President from settling international claims. Id. at 2989-90, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 943-
44. But see note 159 supra for the Marschalk court's interpretation of the FSIA.
201. 101 S. Ct. at 2991, 69 L. Ed. at 946. The Court noted, however, that should an
unconstitutional taking be found, petitioner could seek restitution in the Court of Claims.
Id. at 2991-92, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 946-47. The Court already had determined that the nullifica-
tion of the judicial attachments did not constitute a taking, because the President had the
authority to control the attachments and the claimants had not acquired a sufficient property
interest in the attachments. Id. at 2984 n.6, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 936-37 n.6. In a separate opinion
Justice Powell agreed with the Court's opinion except as to the determination that the at-
tachments nullification did not constitute a taking entitling the claimants to just compensa-
tion. Id. at 2992, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 947. Justice Powell stated that both takin* questions
should have been left open for individual case resolution by the Court of Claims. Id. at
2992-93, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 947 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
202. Id. at 2990, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 944.
203. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For a discussion of Youngstown, see note 64 supra.
204. 101 S. Ct. at 2990, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 944 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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Court's decision to uphold the President's claims settlement actions. The
Court's repeated cautions as to the narrowness of its decision indicate that
the Court primarily intended to avoid the political consequences that
would have resulted if the agreement had been invalidated. The Court,
however, by basing its decision on past claims settlement practice, congres-
sional acquiescence, and judicial recognition of the Presidential power to
settle claims by executive agreement, defeated its own effort to render a
narrow decision of limited precedential effect. In essence, the Court ap-
plied the traditional case-by-case delineation method of establishing the
scope of the total Presidential foreign relations power.20 5 The Court's de-
cision to uphold the Iranian Hostage Agreement stretched the President's
power to settle international claims further than ever before. For the first
time, the Court upheld the President's power to settle claims by suspension
and submission of the claims to arbitration when the claims were before a
United States court prior to the suspension. Yet, the Court persisted in its
avoidance of the fifth amendment taking question relevant to Presidential
claims settlements. As a result the taking question remains a valid consti-
tutional issue in claims settlement practice. Thus, Dames & Moore v. Re-
gan represents an expansion of the President's power to settle international
claims through the traditional means of a Presidential practice acquiesced
to by Congress and recognized by the Supreme Court.
III. CONCLUSION
Traditionally accepted practice has vested the President with the power
to enter executive agreements without the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate. Similarly, the aggregation of Presidential foreign relations power au-
thorizes the President to settle the claims of nonconsenting American
citizens. The Supreme Court, acting to resolve the conflicting opinions of
the lower courts, relied on these generally recognized powers in Dames &
Moore v. Regan and upheld the validity of the President's suspension and
submission to arbitration of American claims against Iran. Acknowledg-
ing that the President's actions were necessary to resolve the hostage crisis,
the Court expanded the President's claim settlement power to new limits
by upholding the settlement of claims already before United States courts
as a valid exercise of Presidential power. In addition, the Court continued
its practice of refusing to invalidate a claims settlement on fifth amend-
ment grounds. As a result, future litigants undoubtedly will give the Court
the opportunity to decide whether Dames & Moore v. Regan will stand as
precedent or will remain merely an emergency adjudication of specific
facts.
205. See notes 71-73 supra and accompanying text.
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